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SOMETHING JUDICIOUS THIS WAY COMES . . .
THE USE OF FORESHADOWING AS A
PERSUASIVE DEVICE IN JUDICIAL NARRATIVE
Michael J. Higdon*
“[I]n Greek romances the gods give the heroes prophetic dreams, which
foreshadow what is to come—not so that the heroes can struggle with their
fate, which is unchangeable, but so that they can bear it more easily.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
In the climactic scene of Steven Spielberg’s 1993 film Jurassic Park,
two adult scientists and two young children are trapped in the control room
of the eponymous dinosaur theme park while a ravenous Velociraptor
(“Raptor”) furiously attempts to break in.2 Although the room is outfitted
with a steel door and powerful lock, the lock can only be activated by the
park’s high-tech security system, and, unfortunately, that computer system
has been disabled with no one being able reactivate it. Thus, the two adults
can only try and hold off the hungry Raptor by bracing the door with their
bodies—a battle they are quickly losing. However, just when it seems the
battle is lost, something “unexpected” happens. One of the children, a
young girl named “Lex,” runs to the computer in the room, “hacks” into the
park’s complicated security files (which, up to this point, none of the adult
scientists have been able to access) and resets the door lock, thus saving
everyone’s life.
Now, if someone had not seen the entire film, but merely this isolated
scene, that person might easily be a bit nonplussed at the manner in which
this conflict was resolved. In fact, such a limited viewer might even find it
completely unbelievable that a young girl could hack into a high-tech
security system. Furthermore, the fact that she was revealed to possess such
a talent at the exact moment such talent was sorely needed would like
appear just a bit too convenient to be persuasive. After all, as one literary
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GARY SAUL MORSON, NARRATIVE AND FREEDOM: THE SHADOWS OF TIME 107
(1994) (emphasis added).
2
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scholar put it, “too good a story is somehow not to be trusted.”3 Of course,
the above-mentioned scene is not the only scene in Jurassic Park but, in
fact, is preceded by several other scenes, many of which help prepare the
viewer for subsequent events. In particular, about thirty minutes prior to the
suspenseful Raptor attack, there is a scene in the film that, although
seemingly irrelevant at the time, is crucial to setting up the viewer for Lex’s
eventual life-saving talent.
In this earlier scene, the children have climbed a tree in Jurassic Park
and, during a relaxed moment, are feeding leaves to a friendly (i.e.,
herbivore) Brachiosaurus. The scene soon takes a humorous turn when the
humongous Brachiosaur sneezes all over Lex, precipitating the following
dialogue between Lex and her younger brother, Tim:
Lex:
Tim:
Lex:
Tim:
Lex:

“Yuck!”
“Oh great! Now she’ll never try anything new. Just sit in
her room and never come out . . . and play on her computer.”
“I’m a hacker!”
“That’s what I said—you’re a nerd.”
“I’m not a computer nerd, I prefer to be called a ‘hacker’!”

This exchange unfolds quickly, and during it, the viewer cannot even see
the faces of the two children. Instead, the two are seen walking away from
the camera while engaging in what seems to be just childish teasing
between two siblings. At the same time they are having this exchange, one
of the adult scientists is walking next to the children, and it is he who is
more the focus of the frame. Indeed, instead of walking away from the
camera like the children, he is actively looking around and investigating the
surroundings. In fact, the children’s dialogue abruptly ends when the
scientist discovers a dinosaur nest full of recently hatched eggs, thus
quickly transitioning the audience to an entirely different topic.
Accordingly, given how the scene is framed, many viewers may not think
much about the substance of the children’s exchange since the conversation
is very short and seemingly irrelevant—not only to that scene but to the
entire film.
Why then would Steven Spielberg include this earlier scene? The
answer is actually quite obvious: doing so made Lex’s subsequent action of
hacking into a complex computer system more believable. Without the
earlier exposition that revealed Lex’s talents, the viewer would likely be
skeptical that a young girl would just happen to posses such skills.
Furthermore, this earlier scene may have an additional benefit. Specifically,
3

JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 5 (2002).
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some viewers, upon realizing that someone needed to get into the computer
system to reengage the steel door, may have even predicted that Lex would
be the one to succeed in that task. Anticipating the event in advance would
make the ultimate occurrence of that event all the more believable. As
discussed infra, people tend to trust conclusions more when they feel they
arrived at those conclusions seemingly on their own.4
If the earlier scene is so important for setting up the viewer, why then
would Spielberg not make the revelation that Lex is a computer hacker
more explicit, rather than downplay the entire dialogue on the topic? The
reason is simple: subtle messages tend to be more persuasive than those
that are overt.5 Had the earlier scene focused too intently on the disclosure
that Lex is a hacker (again, a disclosure that seemed irrelevant at the time)
many viewers would feel manipulated, knowing that they are being forcefed this information simply to make later scenes in the story more
believable. Instead, by downplaying the discussion of Lex’s computer
abilities, most viewers would not even realize the relevance of that
disclosure until that knowledge is needed to process subsequent events.
In essence, Spielberg created the earlier scene (which, in itself, served
little purpose) to foreshadow what happens in the later, much more
important scene. In this sense, “foreshadowing” refers to “the technique or
device whereby some situation or event is hinted at in advance.”6 By
hinting at things to come, foreshadowing can make a work appear more
cohesive as well as more persuasive.7 For those reasons, it is no surprise to
learn that foreshadowing is employed in a wide range of media:
“[e]xamples of foreshadowing can be found throughout literature, in theater,
in movies, on television, and even in music.”8 Furthermore, the use of
foreshadowing has even been documented in historical and scientific
writings.9 The bottom line is that, for any medium that relies on narrative to
convey information, foreshadowing is a very powerful device.
The law is, of course, built heavily on narrative. As Professor Ruth
Anne Robbins states “[e]ven though law is allegedly about something other
than stories, i.e., ‘logic’ and ‘reasoning,’ stories are nevertheless there to
guide the logic and reasoning.”10 That being said, narrative that is found in
4

See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
6
GERALD PRINCE, DICTIONARY OF NARRATOLOGY 33 (2003); see also infra notes 6067 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
8
Jeffrey K. Zeig, Seeding, in BRIEF THERAPY: MYTHS, METHODS, AND METAPHORS
221, 226 (Jeffrey K. Zeig & Stephen G. Gilligan eds, 1990).
9
Nancy Welch, Sideshadowing Teacher Response, 60 COLLEGE ENGLISH 374, 378
(1998).
10
Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to This Symposium,
5
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legal documents typically differs in one key respect from the more
traditional literary narrative: “Literature, exploiting the semblance of
reality, looks to the possible, the figurative. Law looks to the actual, the
literal, the record of the past.”11 Thus, one of the key components of legal
narrative is the legal background that has preceded a current controversy.12
In other words, for any given legal problem, part of the story must include
the relevant law that will ultimately guide the resolution of that particular
case.13 Within that portion of the legal narrative the writer must address a
number of questions: what is the relevant rule of law, what is the policy
underlying the rule, what has the rule been interpreted to mean, and what
fact patterns have triggered application of the rule and which have not. In so
doing, the writer establishes the relevant legal precedent that will guide
resolution of the matter currently before the court.
Accordingly, this “precedential story” naturally takes on great
importance in typical legal narrative as it is this section that prepares the
reader for the ultimate legal analysis.
Within judicial opinions, the
discussion of legal precedent is particularly crucial given that the judge will
rely on this discussion to ultimately explain and justify her ruling. Thus, the
question then becomes how specifically a judicial opinion can introduce and
describe legal precedent so as to make the judge’s ultimate conclusion both
more palatable and more persuasive. It is here that, just as in other forms of
narrative, foreshadowing becomes a very powerful persuasive technique.14
Indeed, just as Spielberg purposefully used foreshadowing to make it more
believable that a young girl could save the day by hacking into a complex
computer system, so too do judges use foreshadowing when laying out and
discussing the legal precedent so as to make their ultimate dipositions more
persuasive.15
The fact that judges use foreshadowing in judicial opinions likely comes
as little surprise. However, merely recognizing that judges sometimes rely
on this literary device fails to advance our understanding of much deeper
issues, including not only the power of the judicial opinion, but also the
largely ignored way in which narrative and human cognition impact how
legal audiences process legal advocacy. Thus, to begin to explore these
14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEAL WRITING INST. 6 (2008); see also infra notes 144-147 and
accompanying text.
11
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 61 (emphasis added).
12
Id. at 37-39; see also John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 447, 473 (2001) (“Opinions tell stories about how law has changed over time.”).
13
See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
14
See infra Part IV.
15
After all, judges (just like the advocates who appear before them) have a strong
interest in crafting judicial opinions that are persuasive. See infra notes 152-158 and
accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1454887

8/14/2009

Something Judicious This Way Comes . . .

5

more complicated questions, the purpose of this Article is to discuss why
exactly, on a psychological level, foreshadowing is so potent. In doing so,
we gain a broader understanding of not just this discrete persuasive device,
but the larger cognitive issues that are implicated by the study of legal
advocacy.
To understand the complex psychology behind foreshadowing, Part II
will first discuss the role that cognitive psychology plays in how individuals
process information generally. By understanding the “forward-looking”
manner with which individuals perceive their environment as well as the
power of subtle persuasion, it begins to become clear how foreshadowing
can impact persuasion. Part III will then look at foreshadowing more
particularly, exploring the device as it has been used in various genres and
focusing on three specific psychological theories upon which
foreshadowing operates: priming theory, schema theory and inoculation
theory. Next, Part IV discusses the way in which judges, in their attempt to
persuade others, employ legal narrative and, more specifically, the narrative
device of foreshadowing in judicial opinions. Finally, Section V will
provide specific examples of how judges use foreshadowing—examples
that help illustrate the intersection between legal advocacy, narrative theory
and psychology.
II. THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND PERCEPTION AND PERSUASION
Psychologically, foreshadowing is an extremely persuasive technique.
As English Professor Nancy Welch describes, “[a] way to predict, a means
to make sense of events that may otherwise confound: that’s what
foreshadowing offers and what makes it such a powerful, omnipresent
device.”16 More specifically, Professor David Bordwell offers the following
description of why foreshadowing can have such a profound impact on a
reader: “if information is unobtrusively ‘planted’ early on, later hypotheses
will become more probable by taking ‘insignificant’ foreshadowing
material for granted.”17
Thus, as these descriptions make clear, foreshadowing operates by
subtly evoking hypotheses in the reader’s mind—hypotheses that will
hopefully match the writer’s ultimate conclusion, thereby making that
conclusion more persuasive.
However, to fully understand why
foreshadowing has this effect on readers, it is first necessary to understand
the cognitive psychology behind 1) how readers process information and 2)
the role that subtlety plays in persuasive discourse. Indeed, what makes
foreshadowing potentially so effective is the way in which the device draws
16
17

Welch, supra note 9, at 378.
DAVID BORDWELL, NARRATION IN THE FICTION FILM 165 (1985).
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upon those components of human cognition.
A. Information Processing: The Constructivist Theory
To understand the cognitive impact that a judicial opinion is likely to
have on a reader, we must begin with the basic proposition that, “[a]ny
theory of the spectator’s activity must rest upon a general theory of
perception and cognition.”18 However, when it comes to the human brain,
perception is not quite as simple as it may appear. Indeed, human
perception goes far beyond the discrete stimuli with which people are
confronted. This is so because “[s]ensory stimuli alone cannot determine a
percept, since they are incomplete and ambiguous.”19 For example, in the
sample below, it is hard to tell whether the middle item is the letter “B” or
the number “13.” 20

In attempting to resolve the ambiguity in this example, the human brain
is aided by context, with the middle character reading more as the letter “B”
when looking exclusively at the vertical list and as the number “13” when
strictly reading horizontally. Regardless, the point is more that the middle
character, when viewed in isolation, is unclear and thus requires the viewer
to search out other data (in this instance, the surrounding context) to
establish meaning. This example illustrates that perception is “something
more than the direct registration of sensations . . . other events intervene
between stimulation and experience.”21 More specifically, when processing
external stimuli, “the inadequate information provided by the senses is
augmented by unconscious inferences, which add meaning to sensory
information.”22 Or as William James said as far back as 1890: “whilst part
18

Id. at 30.
Id. at. 31.
20
Example and image taken from IAN E. GORDON, THEORIES OF VISUAL PERCEPTION
118 (2004).
21
Id. at 119.
22
MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 54 (2000); see
also BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 31 (humans make inferences about their environment
19
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of what we perceive comes through our senses from the object before us,
another part (and it may be the larger part) always comes out of our head.”23
The prevailing psychological theory that describes this process is
referred to as the Constructivist Theory24 (and was first proposed by
Hermann von Helmholtz in 1867).25 Hemholtz argued that, between
sensation and perception, there lies an intermediate process of
construction.26 Thus, Helmholtz posited that the “information available to
our senses, taken by itself, provides ambiguous and misleading information
about its source,” and as a result “perceptions are the product of constant,
unconscious supplementation on the part of the receiver.”27 Finally,
Helmholtz concedes that “because the information that must be
supplemented is inherently ambiguous, perception is essentially
guesswork.”28
Accordingly, under this theory, humans process external data by
forming constructions “from floating fragmentary scraps of data signaled by
the senses and drawn from the brain memory banks, themselves
constructions from snippets of the past.”29 As one leading psychology text
describes, “[p]erception is not directly given by the stimulus input, but
occurs as the end-product of the interaction influences of the presented
stimulus and internal hypotheses, expectations, and knowledge, as well as
motivational and emotional factors.”30 More plainly, what we perceive is
not so much influenced by the things we encounter, but by the hypotheses
that these external stimuli provoke in our minds. Indeed, under the
Constructivist Theory, it this process of forming and testing hypotheses that
heavily determines how the human brain perceives its environment:
Perception becomes a process of active hypothesis-testing.
The organism is tuned to pick up data from the
“in an involuntary, virtually instantaneous manner.”)
23
GERALD E. MEYERS, WILLIAM JAMES: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT 106 (2001).
24
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 30-31 (noting that “it has been the dominant view in
perceptual and cognitive psychology since the 1960s”).
25
ELLEN WINNER, INVENTED WORLDS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ARTS 89 (1982);
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 30; EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 54.
26
GORDON, supra note 20, at 121.
27
WINNER, supra note 25, at 89
28
Id.
29
Alan Branthwaite, Exploring How Advertising Works, THE APPLIED PSYCHOLOGIST
79, 83 (James Hartley & Alan Branthwaite eds., 1999).
30
EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 54; see also GORDON, supra note 20, at 128
(“Signals received by the sensory receptors trigger neural events. Appropriate knowledge
interacts with these inputs to create psychological data. On the basis of such data,
hypotheses are advanced to predict and make sense of events in the world. This chain of
events is the process we call perceiving.”).
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environment. Perceptions tend to be anticipatory, framing
more or less likely expectations about what is out there. . .
. The organism interrogates the environment for
information which is then checked against the perceptual
hypothesis. The hypothesis is thus either confirmed or
disconfirmed; in the latter case, a fresh hypothesis tends to
appear.31
In forming these hypotheses, the human brain will actively fill in
missing data. More specifically, “[w]hen information is missing, perceivers
infer it or make guesses about it.”32 In addition, “people seek causal
connections among events, both in anticipation and in retrospect” and it is
these hypotheses that allow individuals to make such connections.
Furthermore, if during this constructive process, the reader is faced with
competing hypotheses, the brain will attempt to determine which hypothesis
is more likely to be “true.”33 Of course, in filling these gaps, the human
brain does not insert random data, but instead will supply data based on
existing knowledge.34 As Professor Ellen Winner describes in her book,
Invented Worlds: The Psychology of the Arts, “[t]he perceiver does not read
in at random. Projections are guided by our knowledge of what objects tend
to be like. We see what we expect to see. . . our guesses are molded by the
expectations created by context.”35 Perception, then, is hardly a passive
activity. Instead, under the constructivist theory, perception is an “active,
goal-oriented process”36 with the brain having “to do much in order to gain
true knowledge of the world.”37
When it comes to processing narrative, this effort is particularly acute.
As Professor Gabrielle Cliff Hodges describes in her book Tales, Tellers
and Texts:
Reading, viewing or listening to narrative means not just
weaving a way between the worldly and the imagined. It
means actively bringing together a multiplicity of skills:
textual decoding, interpretation and criticism. Watching
31

BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 31 (emphasis added).
Id. at 34. Of course, this “guessing” can sometimes lead to mistakes. As one
psychology text notes “[p]erception is influenced by hypotheses and expectations that are
sometimes incorrect, and so it is prone to error.” EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22 at 54.
33
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 31 (emphasis added).
34
WINNER, supra note 25, at 90 (“Accordingly to Helmholtz, this inference is made
possible by our knowledge of the world, gained from experience.”)
35
Id. (emphasis added).
36
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 31.
37
GORDON, supra note 20, at 119.
32
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films or reading popular fiction sometimes conjures up an
image of passivity, but this begins to fade when we
understand more fully what is involved in different
narratives and consider them critically. Narratives, in
whatever medium, make considerable intellectual,
linguistic and social demands on the producer: to take into
account the audience; to place in sequence and to layer
ideas and events; to establish and sustain characterizations;
to use the medium with fluency and accuracy. They
involve an equally complex set of intellectual procedures
on the part of the receiver. 38
Likewise, much has been written on expert legal readers, a group that
would of course include judges and lawyers, given the complex way in
which they are required to process narratives. Indeed, a number of studies
have shown the critical nature with which expert legal readers process
written data.39 Critical reading, as used in this context, is defined as “the act
of actively engaging material while it is being read, rather than passively
absorbing it.”40 Furthermore, as Professor Philip C. Kissam describes,
“[c]ritical readers will bring prejudgments or prejudices to their
understanding and evaluating of any text.”41 When it comes to reading
judicial opinions, the critical legal reader is well-aware that the opinion will
culminate in a decision by the judge; as such, under the Constructivist
Theory, it is likely that the legal reader, while processing the opinion, would
be actively engaged in forming hypotheses as to the nature of the ultimate
disposition. Again, one of the hallmarks of constructivism is how audience
members form hypotheses to predict the ultimate outcome of a narrative: “It
is the task of classical narration to solicit strongly probable and exclusive
hypotheses and then confirm them.”42
Accordingly, given that a reader’s perception of the written word is
highly premised on the hypotheses that the reader forms while processing
data, an opportunity for persuasion arises. Specifically, if a writer could
38

Gabrielle Cliff Hodges, Trafficking in Human Possibilities, in TALES, TELLERS AND
TEXTS 5 (Gabrielle Cliff Hodges, Mary Jane Drummond & Morag Styles eds., 2000).
39
See generally Leah M. Christensen, The Paradox of Legal Expertise: A Study of
Experts and Novices Reading the Law, 2008 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 53, 57-60 (2008)
(discussing previous studies on expert legal readers).
40
Debra Moss Curtis & Judith R. Karp, Critical Reading in the Legal Writing
Classroom, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293, 299 (2005).
41
Philip C. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 24950 (1988).
42
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 165; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text
(“Perceptions tend to be anticipatory . . .”).
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construct a written document in such a way that the reader is quietly
“helped” to form hypotheses that match the writer’s ultimate conclusion,
then that conclusion would likely be more acceptable and thus more
persuasive to the reader. As detailed infra, the literary technique of
foreshadowing is crucial in this endeavor.43 Of course, to understand why
that is the case, one must first understand how it is exactly that readers are
persuaded.
B. The Power of “Subtle” Persuasion
What makes a particular message “persuasive” is an extremely complex
inquiry that requires consideration of a number of factors: the message
itself, the mode of delivery, the characteristics of the speaker, and the
predispositions of the receiver just to name a few. A discussion of each of
these is, of course, beyond the limited scope of this article. Nonetheless,
there are some characteristics that all persuasive messages possess.
Chief among them is the fact that a persuasive message is one that
results in behavioral conversion or, in other words, “individuals are
persuaded when they have been induced to abandon one set of behaviors
and adopt another.” 44 One such behavioral outcome, and the one most
relevant to foreshadowing is referred to as “response shaping.”45 As
Professor Gerald Miller describes, “[f]requently, individuals possess no
clearly established pattern of response to specific environmental stimuli. In
such instances, persuasion takes the form of shaping and conditioning
particular response patterns to these stimuli.”46 Thus, foreshadowing would
fall into this category because, as is explained more fully in Section III,47
foreshadowing helps shape the reader’s response to the writer’s eventual
argument. Furthermore, one of the things that makes foreshadowing so
effective is that it relies on subtle persuasion, which research shows is a
particularly effective way to persuade.
Indeed, research has revealed that an “influence agent is more
persuasive if the intent to persuade is not obvious.”48 Likewise, research
43

See infra Part III.
Gerald R. Miller, On Being Persuaded: Some Basic Distinctions, in THE
PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 6 (James Price
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).
45
JAMES B. STIFF & PAUL A. MONGEAU, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 5 (2003) (the
other behaviors associated with being persuaded are “response reinforcing” and “response
changing”).
46
Miller, supra note 44, at 7.
47
See infra Part III.
48
Frank R. Kardes, Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising: The Effects of
Conclusion Omission and Involvement on Persuasion, 15 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 225,
44
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has also revealed that “a participant’s awareness of the intent to persuade on
the part of the influencing agent will result in less message acceptance.”49
In explaining why this is so, Professor Kathryn M. Stanchi offers the
following explanation:
Affecting the “self-observation” process of the reader
preserves the reader’s impression that she has
independently arrived at the decision, when in fact the
decision has been influenced by the advocate. Preserving
the appearance of audience autonomy lessens the likelihood
that the audience will feel coerced and angry, feelings
which can lead to the so-called “boomerang effect” in
which the message recipient responds to the persuasive
message by rejecting it or making a decision opposite to the
one advocated.50
In other words, “persuasion is less about showing people that they are
wrong, and more about showing them how they can be right, on their own
terms.”51
For these reasons, studies show that, when processing messages, readers
are more persuaded by conclusions that are implicit rather than explicit,
especially when the reader is more involved in the communication.52 For
example, in one famous study, researchers took seven syllogisms, each of
which built upon one another.53 Cumulatively, the syllogisms lead to the
conclusion that smoking cigarettes caused cancer. Subjects were given the
conclusions to a different number of the seven syllogisms and asked to infer
the remaining conclusions. The final result of the study found that
acceptance of the overall conclusion positively correlated with the amount
of effort the subject had to expend. In other words, subjects who were
asked to expend less effort (i.e., they were simply given the conclusions to
225 (1988).
49
Michael Burgoon, Eusebio Alvaro, Joseph Grandpre & Michael Voulodakis,
Revisiting the Theory of Psychological Resistance: Communicating Threats to Attitudinal
Freedom, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 224-25.
50
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 411, 422 (2006).
51
Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Persuasion, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61, 67
(2003)
52
By “implicit conclusion,” we mean that the author left it to the audience to draw the
intended conclusion instead of stating that conclusion outright (i.e., “explicit conclusion”).
53
See Darwyn E. Linder & Stephen Worchel, Opinion Change as a Result of
Effortfully Drawing a Counterattitudinal Conclusion, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 432 (1970)
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most of the syllogisms) were less accepting of the overall conclusion than
those who had to expend greater effort.54 This result can be attributed to
what some have called “the ownness bias” or the tendency of “audience
members to consider their own thoughts to be stronger than message
arguments.”55
Thus, it follows that legal audience members are more persuaded by
conclusions they arrive at implicitly rather than those they are explicitly
given. In fact, subtlety arguably plays an even bigger role in legal argument
given how skeptical legal readers tend to be. As Professor Jerome Bruner
points out in his book Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life, because
members of the legal audience know that “lawyers tell stories committed to
an adversarial rhetoric . . . [l]aw stories simply are not, have never been, and
probably will never be taken at face value.”56 When it comes to judges, this
skepticism is even greater. As Professor Linda Edwards notes in her book
Legal Writing, “While any law-trained reader is a skeptical reader, testing
the analysis at each step, a judge is particularly so. This skepticism and
testing is the heart of a judge's job."57
For all these reasons then, foreshadowing takes on particular power in
legal narrative given that foreshadowing, as detailed in the next section,
operates by creating implicit conclusions. Specifically, because expert legal
readers tend to be more critical, more skeptical, and more involved when
processing legal messages,58 the use of foreshadowing and its reliance on
both subtlety and implicit conclusions, can be a particularly effective
method of legal persuasion.
III. FORESHADOWING: THE PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND “PRE-PERSUASION”
Foreshadowing, which exists in a variety of expressive works,59 has
54

Id. at 441. (“[A]ttitude change was significantly greater the more conclusions the
subjects were asked to find for themselves.).
55
STIFF & MONGEAU, supra note 45, at 143 (citing Richard M. Perloff & Timothy C.
Brock, “. . . And thinking makes it so”:Cognitive Responses to Persuasion, in PERSUASION:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 67, 84 (Michael E. Roloff & Gerald R. Miller
eds., 1980).
56
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 42.
57
LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS &
ORGANIZATION 241 (2006)
58
For a discussion of involvement as it pertains to legal advocacy, see generally
Stanchi, supra note 50, at 444 (“Attempting to trigger response involvement is a common
practice in legal brief-writing. Whenever an advocate makes an argument directed at a
judge’s concern over public scrutiny, or that is crafted to ‘sound good’ and is likely to be
one that easily transfers into the opinion, that is directed (in part) toward response
involvement.”).
59
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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been defined quite simply as something which “projects onto the present a
shadow from the future.”60 In other words, foreshadowing “indicates
backward causality” as it is “a shadow cast in advance of an object.”61 It is
important to note, however, that these shadows are not of “objects that
might be ahead of us, but only those that are ahead of us.”62 In so doing,
foreshadowing helps preclude the possibility of options.63 Indeed, one of
the purposes of foreshadowing is to avoid surprises.64
By casting these shadows, foreshadowing then operates to “activate[e]
an intended target by presenting an earlier hint.”65 Or, as one scholar
describes: “Through foreshadowing, that early scene simultaneously
predicts and confirms a future that then appears as an inevitability, the only
course the story could have taken.”66 Of course, the meaning of this early
scene is often not understood until later on. As Rolf Lunden states in his
book, The United Stories of America: Studies in the Short Story Composite,
the scene which casts the foreshadow (a scene Lunden refers to as the
“narrative seed”) merely prepares the reader for the ultimate resolution of
the story and, in that sense, “is only fully understood in retrospect.”67 For
example, the Jurassic Park scene described at the beginning of this Article,
in which the young girl was being teased about her computer abilities,
might not have lead the viewer to anticipate that the young girl would
eventually hack into a computer and save everyone’s life; nonetheless, the
scene does make her subsequent actions much more believable.
Foreshadowing then, by its very nature, is a subtle device. As
Professors Bae and Young describe the term, “[f]oreshadowing implicitly
alludes to a future event in a manner that makes it difficult to recognize its
meaning until the event actually happens.”68 Or, as noted earlier, the
information that is intended to foreshadow later events should be positioned
“unobtrusively.”69 Otherwise, the subject may feel manipulated, which,

60

Welch, supra note 9, at 378 (emphasis added); see also MORSON, supra note 1, at 47
(“[F]oreshadowing gives the reader a sign indicating what will happen”).
61
MORSON, supra note 1, at 48.
62
Id. at 49. In other words, “foreshadowing gives the reader a sign of what will
happen.” Id. at 47.
63
Id. at 49.
64
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 165.
65
Zeig, supra note 8, at 222.
66
Welch, supra note 9, at 378.
67
ROLF LUNDEN, THE UNITED STORIES OF AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE SHORT STORY
COMPOSITE 63 (1999).
68
Byung-Chull Bae & R. Michael Young, A Use of Flashback and Foreshadowing for
Surprise Arousal in Narrative Using a Plan-Based Approach, in INTERACTIVE
STORYTELLING 156 (Ulrike Spierling & Nicolas Szilas eds., 2008).
69
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1454887

14

Something Judicious This Way Comes . . .

8/14/2009

again, can undermine the ability to persuade.70 For these reasons, literary
scholars caution that “the best clues in a story . . . are camouflaged as
ordinary events, ‘without anticipation.’”71
These general definitions, however, belie the true complexity and power
behind foreshadowing. Far from merely being a literary device, there are a
whole host of psychological studies that help explain why the use of
foreshadowing has such a powerful cognitive impact. Thus, to better
understand the power behind foreshadowing, the remainder of this
subsection will discuss three psychological theories, each of which is
crucial to understanding the way in which foreshadowing operates: 1)
Priming Theory; 2) Schema Theory; and 3) Inoculation Theory.
A. Priming Theory
As detailed earlier, foreshadowing serves to prepare an audience
member for a later point that the author will make.72 Thus, foreshadowing
is, in essence, an example of “priming,” as that term is used in psychology.
Quite simply, “priming” refers to the use of a stimulus, or prime, to alter
audience members’ perceptions of subsequent information.73 Additionally,
priming has also been defined as “a procedure that increases the
accessibility of some category or construct in memory.”74 Beyond these
general definitions, however, priming is an extremely complex
phenomenon. Not only are psychologists unclear about how exactly
priming impacts perception,75 but priming also comes in two distinct
varieties: Affective Priming and Cognitive Priming.
Affective priming is based on the premise that, when confronted with a
stimulus, “people unconsciously generate affective reactions to the context,
[which, in turn,] may influence subsequent judgments.”76 For example, one
study found that the mood of a viewer while watching a television
70

See supra Part II.B.
CHARLES J. RZEPKA, DETECTIVE FICTION 29 (2008).
72
See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
73
Shelia T. Murphy & R.B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective
Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposure, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 723, 723 (1993).
74
Curtis P. Haugtvedt, Richard J. Shakarchi, Bendik M. Samulson & Kaiya Liu,
Consumer Psychology and Attitude Change, in RESISTANCE AND PERSUASION 283, 287
(Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn eds., 2003)
75
Justin Storbeck & Michael D. Robinson, Preferences and Inferences in Encoding
Visual Objects: A Systematic Comparison of Semantic and Affective Priming, 30
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 81, 82 (2004) (“[T]he underlying
mechanism [in studies of priming], if there is a primary one, is unclear.”).
76
Youjae Yi, Cognitive and Affective Priming Effects of the Context for Print
Advertisements, 19 J. ADVERTISING 40, 42 (1990).
71
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commercial largely mirrored the mood generated by the television program
that immediately lead into the commercial.77 In this context, then, “affect”
refers to “expressions of preference”78 or, more specifically, the audience
member’s feelings and attitudes towards the message.79 As a result,
affective responses have been defined as the “quick and dirty route for
evaluation.”80
Although affective priming can occur both consciously and
subconsciously,81 most of the existing studies deal with the latter. For
example, in one famous study, subjects were presented with an assortment
of novel Chinese ideographs and asked to rate each ideograph as to
likeability.82 Using a number of control groups, the study found that
subjects rated the ideographs “significantly higher” when the ideograph was
preceded by a photograph of a smiling face.83 However, this was only true
when the photograph was presented for an extremely short duration—so
short, in fact, so as to make it inaccessible to the conscious mind.84 Thus,
what this study, and others like it, have concluded is that, first, it takes only
minimal stimuli to produce an affective response: “The affective primacy
hypothesis holds that affective reactions can be elicited with minimal
stimulus input.”85 Second, affective judgments are made both quickly and
subconsciously: “It is often proposed that the process of automatic stimulus
evaluation occurs at a very early stage in information processing, that
several stimuli can be evaluated in parallel, and that basic process is fast,
unintentional, efficient, and occurring outside of awareness.”86
Of course, as other studies have demonstrated, a prime need not be
subliminal in order to produce an affective response. For instance, one
77

See Marvin E. Goldberg & Gerald J. Gorn, Happy and Sad TV Programs: How They
Affect Reactions to Commercials, 14 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 387 (1987).
78
Murphy & Zajonc, supra note 73, at 724.
79
See James C. McCroskey et al., Nonverbal Communication in Instructional
Contexts, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 421, 424 (Valerie
Manusov & Miles L. Patterson eds., 2006).
80
Storbeck & Robinson, supra note 75, at 81.
81
Siu-Lan Tan, Matthew P. Spackman & Matthew A. Bezdek, Viewers’
Interpretations of Film Characters’ Emotions: Effects of Presenting Film Music Before or
After a Character is Shown, 25 MUSIC PERCEPTION 135, 138 (2007).
82
See Murphy & Zajonc, supra note 73.
83
Id. at 725.
84
Id. (“In contrast, optimally presented affective priming failed to produce a
significant shift in subjects’ liking of the 10 repeated ideographs.”).
85
Id. at 723.
86
Dirk Hermans, Jan De Houwer & Paul Eelen, A Time Course Analysis of the
Affective Priming Effect, 15 COGNITION AND EMOTION 143, 144 (2001); See also EYSENCK
& KEANE, supra note 22, at 490 (“According to the affective primacy hypothesis, simple
affective qualities of stimuli can be processed much faster than more cognitive ones.”).
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study of cinematic music found that music in film can impact the audience’s
perceived emotions of the film’s characters: “when asked to label a film
character’s emotions in an open-ended question, after viewing a scene with
‘fear’ music, participants indicated the characters were experiencing fear.
However, when the same scene was shown with ‘happiness’ music,
participants tended to attribute happiness to the film character.”87
Furthermore, the study found that “the emotions were generally perceived
to be more intense when the music was presented before the scene rather
than after the scene.”88 Accordingly, the researchers surmised that “the prescene music served a more effective priming function, invoking schema that
guided participants’ attention to cues following the music so that the main
action sequences were interpreted in a manner consistent with the emotion
of the music.” 89 Thus, a prime need not be subliminal to produce an
affective response. Nonetheless, priming does appear to work more
effectively when the prime precedes the intended target and the viewer is
not overtly aware of the priming influence.90
In contrast to affective responses, cognitive responses are defined as
“such judgments as recognition memory, feature identification,
categorization, and psychophysical judgments that deal with estimates of
sensory and perceptual qualities.”91 Cognitive priming, then, concerns “the
effects of prior context on the interpretation and retrieval of information,
focus[ing] on the effects of long-term memory on the processing of new
information.”92 To illustrate, Professor Youjai Yi describes how cognitive
priming might operate when viewing an advertisement for a car:
[T]he advertising context (e.g., a crime story) can prime or
activate certain attributes (e.g., safety) to readers, and guide
their interpretations of product information in the ad (e.g.,
car size). These interpretations may result in the formation
or change of beliefs about the advertised brand, which will
87

Tan et al., supra note 81, at 146.
Id. (“It appears that hearing the pre-scene music primed participants to look for signs
in the facial expressions that match the music’s emotions and attributed these emotions to
neutral faces.”).
89
Id.
90
See Gerald L. Clore & Simone Schnall, The Influence of Affect on Attitude, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 437, 450 (Dolores Albarracin, Blair T. Johnson & Mark P.
Zanna eds., 2005) (“Increased liking of a stimulus also occurs when participants are not
consciously aware of having been repeatedly exposed to that stimulus.”).
91
Murphy & Zajonc, supra note 73, at 724.
92
Lars Willnat, Agenda Setting and Priming: Conceptual Links and Differences, in
COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY: EXPLORING THE INTELLECTUAL FRONTIERS IN
AGENDA-SETTING THEORY 51, 53 (Maxwell McCombs, Donald L. Shaw & David Weaver
eds., 1997).
88
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affect consumers’ brand evaluations. Since this process
affects ad effectiveness primarily by increasing the
accessibility of attributes, this aspect of the ad environment
will be called a “cognitive context.”93
Thus, in contrast to affective priming, which primarily concerns triggering a
likeability response, cognitive priming, which “is built on the assumption
that the frequency, prominence, or feature of a stimulus activates previously
learned cognitive structures,” is concerned with triggering an analytical
response.94
Despite this difference, cognitive priming is nonetheless an effective
technique primarily due to the way it serves to manipulate memory. Indeed,
when presented with novel stimuli, people “do not evaluate all of the
information they have or can find about that topic, weight it according to
some priorities, and then calculate a logical response.”95 To repeatedly
engage in such a process would be crippling to the human mind given the
large number of stimuli with which it is constantly bombarded. Instead,
humans often use short cut devices, or schemata, to quickly analyze new
stimuli.96 Cognitive priming operates then by prepping certain schemata so
that they are more easily accessible. As the authors of the influential work,
Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in
Agenda-Setting Theory explain, cognitive priming “can be explained by
information accessibility, or the idea that recently and frequently activated
or primed concepts come to mind more easily than concepts that have not
been activated by prior stimuli.”97
For instance, numerous studies have documented the persuasive impact
that cognitive priming plays in the political arena. These studies have
labeled this practice “media priming,” a term that “refers to the tendency of
audience members to evaluate their political leaders according to the
93

Yi, supra note 76, at 40.
Willnat, supra note 92, at 53.
95
Gerald M. Kosicki, The Media Priming Effect, in THE PERSUASION HANDOOK:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 70-71. Studies on how
individuals process news media offer additional support for this method of selective
processing. See Willnat, supra note 92, at 56 (“Because most people rely on the mass
media for information about political events and selectively attend to issues that seem
important, the accessibility of information in memory is determined to a great extent by
which stories the media chose to cover.”).
96
See infra Part III.B.
97
Willnat, supra note 92, at 54. To illustrate, Willnat offers the following: “If, for
example a person reads a newspaper article about a new computer virus that destroyed data
stored on a government computer, and an ambiguous conversation reference to ‘virus”
occurs a few minutes later, the person is likely to think of ‘virus’ as a destructive computer
program rather than a microscopic organism.” Id. at 53.
94
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particular events and issues that have been highlighted in news reports.” 98
The potency of media priming was displayed by Professors Shanto Iyengar
and Donald Kinder in an oft-cited 1987 study.99 In that study, the two
scientists presented subjects with a number of news stories, some of which
heavily emphasized the important role of a strong national defense
program.100 Subsequently, the subjects were asked to rate the President of
the United States on a number of factors, including defense. The results
showed that “for people who saw multiple stories about defense (i.e., those
who were primed on that theme), the impact of ratings on the president’s
performance on defense was more than twice as great as that for people who
were not so primed.”101 Thus, the human brain, when confronted with a
new stimulus, goes in search of previously stored data to aid in
interpretation of that stimulus. Cognitive priming then operates to limit the
available data from which the brain will select given that the brain is more
likely to immediately consult and rely on previously primed data.102
Of course, regardless of whether it operates on an affective or a
cognitive level, priming succeeds not simply through the introduction of a
priming influence. Instead, it is the stored data, or schema, that this prime
evokes that ultimately leads to a particular response in the audience
member’s mind. Accordingly, the next section will discuss the way in
which these schema influence human perception.
B. Schema Theory
Pretend that you are visiting a restaurant for the first time. As you enter
the establishment, you likely anticipate that you will be seated, given a
menu, offered a beverage and ultimately served the food that you select
from the menu. Why though would you hold such expectations? There was
no sign on the door preparing you for this string of events and, again, this is
your first time even dining at this particular restaurant. The answer of
course is simple: these events are anticipated because these events are
98

Kosicki, supra note 95, at 64.
SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS 65-69 (1987)
100
Id.
101
Kosicki, supra note 95, at 72. The study also revealed that, having been primed on
the defense-related issues, “a one point improvement in [the subject’s] assessment of [the
president’s] performance on defense produced nearly a two-thirds of a point improvement
in their evaluation of his general job performance” in contrast to subjects who were not
shown newscasts involving defense, where a one-point improvement in defense produced
only “about a one-quarter point improvement in evaluations of his general job
performance.” see also IYENGAR & KINDER, supra note 99, at 66.
102
Kosicki, supra note 95, at 71 (priming causes individuals to evaluate a stimulus
using “only a sample of readily available information.”).
99
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generally what happens when one dines in a restaurant. 103
This example, then, provides a very basic example of Schema Theory.
“Schema,” as that term is used in social psychology, refers to “to any cluster
of features that have become associated with a referent and stored in
memory as a unit.”104 Likewise, one of the leading texts on cognitive
psychology defines schema as “a structured cluster of concepts; usually, it
involves generic knowledge and may be used to represent events, sequences
of events, percepts, situations, relations, and even objects.” 105 Furthermore,
schema come in a variety of forms: prototypes (what a certain thing tends
to look like), templates (a filing system, for example), and procedural
patterns (learned behaviors such as how to ride a bicycle).106 Despite the
different forms they can take, schema essentially operate as “cheat sheets”
or “rules of thumb.”107
Indeed, “cheat sheet” is an apt description given that humans use stored
knowledge, or schemata, to allow the human brain to analyze and
comprehend new data much more quickly.108 Accordingly, schemata play a
large role in almost all human cognition.109 As noted Professor and Scholar
Steven Pinker describes:
We mortals have to make fallible guesses from fragmentary
information. Each of our mental modules solves this
unsolvable conundrum by a leap of faith about how the
world works. We use prefabricated mental cheat sheets to
guide the making of indispensable assumptions – the only
defense for which being that the assumptions worked well
enough in the world of our ancestors.110
103

See KEITH RAYNER & ALEXANDER POLLATSEK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READING 304
(1994) (“A restaurant schema, retrieved from memory is essentially a structured sequence
of events in a meal. Both a schema and certain default values for what happens are
retrieved. The default values are presumably the sequence of actions that occur in your
‘normal’ restaurant experience.”).
104
Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Dolores Albarracin, Belief Formation, Organization, and
Change: Cognitive and Motivational Influences, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES, supra
note 90, at 273, 280.
105
EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 252.
106
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 31.
107
KENDALL HAVEN, STORY PROOF: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STARTLING POWER OF
STORY 48 (2007) (noting that schema are also referred to as “neural maps”).
108
See EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 254. (“Schemata, thus, encode general or
generic knowledge that can be applied to many specific situations, if those situations are
instances of the schema.”).
109
Id. at 497 (noting that “schemas influence most cognitive processes such as
attention, perception, learning and retrieval of information.”).
110
STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 30 (1997) (“Only an angel could be a
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Schemata plays a key role in the Constructivist Theory of human
perception, described supra, given that it is schema that allow a person to
project the hypotheses and expectations that factor so heavily in the
constructivist model.111 Kendal Haven, an expert on the subject of
storytelling, describes the way in which the theory works as follows:
schemata “activate banks of prior knowledge to identify the ‘best guess’ for
each missing bit of information.”112 Haven goes on to point out just how
powerful these schema can be, noting that schema can “spin a few incoming
signals into entire scenarios complete with character profiles, intents,
dangers, possible actions, and likely outcomes.”113 Thus, humans use
schema to fill in missing data and thus “make the world a more predictable
place.”114
Furthermore, like foreshadowing in general, the schema we operate
under can be quite persuasive.115 For one thing, schema can work to
influence initial judgments about new data. In fact, one study found that we
tend to have strong affective responses to new people we meet based simply
on our perceptions of that person’s membership in a group of people of
which we have already formed certain judgments.116 This is so because,
once formed, schema can be quite durable: “when people have formed a
representation on the basis of new information, they later use the
representation as a basis for judgments and decisions without consulting the
information on which it was based.”117 Accordingly, one seeking to
persuade can attempt to provoke certain responses simply by trying to elicit
certain schema in the audience member’s mind. As one scholar describes,
“thinking about two entities in relation to one another should increase their
association in memory and, therefore, should increase the likelihood that
general problem-solver.”).
111
See BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 164 (“On the basis of such schemata, the viewer
projects hypotheses.”); EYNSECK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 352 (“A crucial function of
schemas is that they allow us to form expectations.”).
112
HAVEN, supra note 107, at 48.
113
Id.
114
EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 352.
115
Alexander Todorov, Shelly Chaiken, Marlone D. Henderson, The HeuristicSystematic Model of Social Information Processing, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 195, 197 (“Persuasion effects
are mediated by simple rules, schemata, or heuristics that associate heuristic cues with a
probability that the advocated position is valid.”).
116
Clore & Schnall, supra note 90, at 449 (“Thus, in political discourse . . . candidates
attempt to get voters to place their opponents in undesirable categories and to place
themselves in desirable categories. They do so with knowledge that individuals are painted
with the same brush as the categories of which they are seen to be members.”).
117
Wyer & Albarracin, supra note 104, at 280.
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calling attention to one of the events will stimulate thoughts about the other
as well.”118
Indeed, so powerful are these schema that humans, when confronted
with new information, need not even analyze all new data to process the
new information. For example, if shown a picture of a typical home
kitchen, most humans would not have to look at many items in the picture
to correctly identify that the picture is indeed of a kitchen. Thus,
“[s]chemata reduce the amount of processing the perceptual system needs to
carry out to identify expected objects, thus freeing up resources for
processing more novel and unexpected aspects of the scene.”119 In fact, one
study found that subjects would take twice as long when looking at pictures
of scenes that contained unexpected items.120 As a result, not only can an
author use schema theory to conjure up schemata that is favorable to the
author’s purpose, he can also manipulate details to make it less likely that
an audience member will conjure up unfavorable schemata. More
specifically, including things that are seemingly incompatible with certain
“undesirable” schema can make the viewer regard that schema as ultimately
inapplicable or, at least, more questionable; in either case, the author is
slowing the immediate impact this unfavorable schemata might pose.
Finally, schemata theory not only impacts initial perception but also has
a profound impact on subsequent recall. In 1932, noted psychologist
Bartlett argued that schema plays a critical role in what we remember from
stories.121 More specifically, “memory is affected not only by the presented
story but also by the participant’s store of relevant prior knowledge in the
form of schemas.”122 In fact, it appears that the more time that elapses
between the event and later recall of the event, the more memory of the
exact material is replaced by memory of the schema that the reader
associated with that material. For example, one study provided the
following story to a number of subjects:
Carol Harris was a problem child from birth. She was wild,
stubborn, and violent. By the time Carol turned eight, she
was still unmanageable. Her parents were very concerned
about her mental health. There was no good institution for
her problem in the state. Her parents finally decided to take
118

Id. at 283.
EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 256.
120
See Alinda Friedman, Framing Pictures: The Role of Knowledge in Automatised
Encoding and Memory for Gist, 108 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 316 (1979).
121
See generally FREDERIC C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932).
122
EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 22, at 352.
119
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some action. They hired a private teacher for Carol.123
Other participants received the same story, but in their case, the name
“Carol Harris” was changed to “Helen Keller.” When later asked about the
story, those who were told the story was about Keller were much more
likely to incorrectly believe that the story they were given contained the line
“She was deaf, dumb, and blind.”124 Furthermore, this mistake in recall
became more prevalent the longer it had been since the subject was
provided the story.125 Thus, schema (which, in the above example, was the
preexisting knowledge about Helen Keller) can persuasively impact not
only initial perceptions but subsequent recall as well.
Given the impact it can have on subsequent recall, as the next section
details, schemata can also be employed to not only color how a discrete
work is initially perceived and subsequently recalled, but also how an
audience member might even perceive future works on the same topic.
C. Inoculation Theory
Whereas an author would frequently employ schema and affective
priming to foreshadow subsequent points within the same work,
foreshadowing need not operate solely within a single work. Specifically,
many authors might wish to foreshadow and respond to potential objections
that a third party may subsequently raise in response to the author’s original
work. In so doing, the author can help make his original message much
more persuasive to his audience. Inoculation Theory, as developed and
defined by social psychologists, helps explain this phenomenon.
Professor Kathleen Hall Jamieson has argued that, where an author can
predict resistance to a particular message, such resistance can be preempted
through inoculation.126 In essence, “Inoculation theory asserts that people
can resist attitude change if they are trained to consciously generate
responses to anticipated persuasive messages targeting a particular attitude
or value.”127 As Professor Kathryn Stanchi explains:

123

R.A. Sulin & D.J. Dooling, Intrustion of a Thematic Idea in Retention of Prose, 103
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 256 (1974).
124
Id. at 257-58.
125
Id. at 259-62 (concluding that “thematic effects increase with the passage of time”).
126
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTIONS, DISTRACTIONS, AND
DEMOCRACY 107 (1992) (“If an attack can be anticipated, the most effective action is preemption through use of inoculation.”).
127
Blair T. Johnson, Gregory R. Maio & Aaron Smith-McLallen, Communication and
Attitude Change: Causes, Processes, and Effects, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES, supra
note 90, at 650.
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The theory of inoculation is based on the idea that
advocates can make the recipient of a persuasive message
“resistant” to opposing arguments, much like a vaccination
makes a patient resistant to disease. In an inoculation
message, the message recipient is exposed to a weakened
version of arguments against the persuasive message
coupled with appropriate refutation of those opposing
arguments. The theory is that introducing a “small dose” of
message contrary to the persuader’s position makes the
message recipient immune to attacks from the opposing
side. Inoculation works because the introduction of a small
dose of the opposing argument induces the message
recipient to generate arguments that refute the opposing
argument, the intellectual equivalent of producing
antibodies.
Once the message recipient generates
refutational arguments, she will be less likely to accept the
opposing argument when it is presented to her by the
opposing side because she will already have a cache of
ammunition with which to resist the opposing argument.128
As the above quote indicates, successful inoculation involves two
components. First, and “the most distinguishing feature of inoculation,”129
is the threat. In this context, a threat is merely “a warning of possible future
attacks on attitudes and the recognition of attitude vulnerability to
change.”130 Such threats “elicit[] the motivation to protect attitudes and,
thus, cultivates resistance to counterpersuasion.”131 As Stanchi explains,
“when people read a set of supporting arguments, they experience a ‘threat’
or ‘dissonance’ when presented with an opposing viewpoint. This threat
motivates them to develop or seek out refutational arguments.”132 This is
128

Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing With Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse
Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 399-400 (2008). Interestingly, one
of the events that lead to the development of this theory was a study of the way in which,
during the Korean war, American prisoners were persuaded to cooperate with the enemy,
not through physical intimidation, but through indoctrination. This was so because the
Americans had never before really questioned their patriotism and American values. As
such, the prisoners lacked immunity to counterarguments and were thus more susceptible
to influence. Id. at 400-01.
129
Michael Pfau, Inoculation Model of Resistance to Influence, in PROGRESS IN
COMMUNICATION SCIENCES: ADVANCES IN PERSUASION 133, 137 (George Barnett &
Franklin J. Boster eds., 1997).
130
Erin Alison Szabo & Michael Pfau, Nuances in Inoculation, in THE PERSUASION
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 235.
131
Id.
132
Stanchi, supra note 128, at 406.
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because “people want to resolve dissonance and will gravitate toward a path
that allows them to alleviate the threat to the position advocated.”133 For
example, in the context of a campaign to curb teenage smoking, the
following “threat” was given to students who had just begun seventh grade:
“as a result of significant peer pressure in the seventh grade, many of them
would become uncertain about smoking, and some would change their
minds and try smoking.”134
Threats alone, however, are insufficient to create an inoculation effect.
In addition, the threat must be paired with, what social science refers to as,
refutational preemption. Whereas the threat operates on a more emotional
level, refutational preemption is more cognitive, in that it “provides
receivers with specific arguments they can use to strengthen their attitudes
against subsequent influence.”135 For example, in the teenage smoking
study mentioned earlier, the subjects were not only told of the threat that
peer pressure poses but also the arguments peers might use to encourage
smoking and the truth as to those arguments.136 Thus, threat and
refutational preemption are indispensable counterparts to successful
inoculation: “refutational preemption provides scripts; threat provides
motivation.”137
To fully understand, however, the purpose and function of inoculation,
one must also look beyond psychology to the field of rhetoric. Indeed,
classical rhetoric provides its own term for messages that are designed to
inoculate audience members from anticipated counterarguments. This term
is known as “prolepsis,” and quite simply, has been defined as “the
anticipation of an objection” and a preclusion of such objections “by
articulating them, and even answering them” within the original message.138
133

Id.
Michael Pfau, Steve Van Bockern & Jong Guen Kang, Use of Inoculation to
Promote Resistance to Smoking Initiation Among Adolescents, 59 COMM. MONOGRAPHS
213, 219 (1992).
135
Szabo & Pfau, supra note 130, at 235.
136
See Pfau, Van Bockern & Geun Kang, supra note 134, at 219 (“In the refutational
preemption component, specific challenges to their attitudes were raised (e.g., smoking is
socially ‘cool’; experimental smoking won’t result in regular smoking; smoking won’t
affect me), and then refuted.”).
137
Szabo & Pfau, supra note 130, at 235 (“The inoculative pretreatment identifies
attitudinal counterarguments, supplies refutations of these counterarguments, and provides
an operational model of attitude defense.”).
138
MARK CURRIE, ABOUT TIME: NARRATIVE, FICTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF TIME
29 (2007); see also BERNARD DUPRIEZ, A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY DEVICES: GRADUS AZ 355 (1991) (defining “prolepsis” as “a figure in which objection or arguments are
anticipated in order to preclude their use, answer them in advance, or prepare them for an
unfavorable reaction.”). Additionally, prolepsis is sometimes referred to as “praemunitio.”
See JAMES L. JASINSKI, SOURCEBOOK ON RHETORIC: KEY CONCEPTS IN CONTEMPORARY
134
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Or as Professor Douglas Walton explains, “[u]sing prolepsis, an agent can
use advance strategy to deal with objections he reasonably expects to be felt
by his respondent or audience, even before the respondent has voiced that
objection.”139
As such, prolepsis is considered “an essential part of the argumentation
strategy” given that it contributes to an author’s ability to persuade in two
ways.140 First, as Professor Christopher W. Tindale explains, the power of
prolepsis lies partly in the fact that “the audience is able to ‘experience’ the
reasoning insofar as prolepsis presents to the mind the semblance of an
exchange into which the audience enters.”141 In so doing, the device creates
a sense of collaboration between the author and the receiver.142 Second, the
use of prolepsis provides at least the appearance of objectivity as it makes
the author appear to be “trying to conceive things from the other point of
view and treating that point of view in a reasonable fashion.”143 Thus,
prolepsis is very much rooted in inoculation theory as both recognize the
persuasive power of two-sided messages, yet both operate so as to bolster
the strength of one side by actively undermining the other.
In sum, despite the different forms Priming, Schema and Inoculation
Theory take and the different ways in which they operate on the human
brain, the three theories all share one common characteristic: each deals
with the process whereby an earlier message results in a subsequent
message being more or less acceptable to the audience. Again, this result is
what we refer to generally as foreshadowing. Given then the various and
complex psychological theories that lie behind this literary device, we begin
to see how foreshadowing can operate as such a powerful tool in legal
narrative.

IV. THE ROLE OF FORESHADOWING IN JUDICIAL NARRATIVE
As noted in the introduction to this Article, narrative plays a crucial role
within the legal system.144 In describing that role, some have even gone so
RHETORICAL STUDIES 554, 557 (2001).
139
DOUGLAS WALTON, MEDIA ARGUMENTATION: DIALECTIC, PERSUASION, AND
RHETORIC 141 (2007)
140
Id. at 142. Walton even describes prolepsis as “the main dialectical element of
rhetorical argumentation.” Id. at 334.
141
CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION: PRINCIPLES OF
THEORY AND PRACTICE 84 (2004) (Prolepsis allows an author to make a point by
employing “a series of imagined objections and counters to those objections.”).
142
Id.
143
Id. at 85.
144
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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far as to say that “Law lives on narrative.”145 To explain why narrative is so
prevalent within the law, Professors Amsterdam and Bruner offer the
following description:
[T]he law is awash in storytelling. Clients tell stories to
lawyers, who must figure out what to make of what they
hear. As clients and lawyers talk, the client’s story gets
recast into plights and prospects, plots and pilgrimages into
possible worlds. . . . If circumstances warrant, the lawyers
retell their clients’ stories in the form of pleas and
arguments to judges and testimony to juries. . . . Next,
judges and jurors tell the stories themselves or to each other
in the form of instructions, deliberations, a verdict, a set of
findings, or an opinion. And then it is the turn of
journalists, commentators, and critics. This endless telling
and retelling, casting and recasting is essential to the
conduct of the law. It is how law’s actors comprehend
whatever series of events they make the subject of their
legal actions. It is how they try to make their actions
comprehensible again within some larger series of events
they take to constitute the legal system and the culture that
sustains it.146
Of course, recognizing the prevalence of legal narrative fails to identify
the precise role that narrative plays in legal rhetoric or, more specifically,
how legal narrative contributes to persuasion. After all, we know that
“advocates rely on narrative to persuade”147—but why? Well, the reason
for this reliance is quite simple: “narrative corresponds more closely to the
manner in which the human mind makes sense of experience than does the
conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law.”148 In other words, narrative
structure contributes to persuasion because of the fact that “narrative is
linguistically or psychologically ‘innate,’ as natural to human
comprehension of the world as our visual rendering of what the eye sees
145

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW: HOW COURTS
RELY ON STORYTELLING AND HOW THEIR STORIES CHANGE THE WAYS WE UNDERSTAND
THE LAW—AND OURSELVES 110 (2000).
146
Id.
147
Elyse Pepper, The Case for “Thinking Like a Filmmaker,” 14 LEGAL WRITING: J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 171, 204 (2008).
148
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 M ICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989) (“In narrative, we take experience
and configure it in a conventional and comprehensible form. This is what gives narrative
its communicative power; it is what makes narrative a powerful tool of persuasion.”).
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into figure and ground.”149 Indeed, legal narrative “persuades people
because of its ‘likeness,’ which, in turn, is based on a person’s knowledge
about ‘how things happen in the real world.’150 For all these reasons, some
have posited that “[s]tory may be the strongest non-violent persuasion
method we know.”151
And it is not just attorneys who employ the persuasive power of
narrative. Indeed, “[j]udges are storytellers too.”152 As Bruner explains,
“Once a case has been decided, the decision may of course be appealed to a
higher court—which offers further opportunity for legal storytelling.”153 As
is the case with legal narrative in general, this judicial narrative is often
aimed at persuasion: “Writing opinions is a lot like writing briefs. Both are,
at bottom, efforts to persuade. Lawyers want to satisfy clients and win
cases. Judges want to persuade lawyers, litigants, and the community at
large that the decision they have made . . . is the absolutely correct one.”154
Although the possibility of appellate review is a particularly motivating
force behind the use of persuasive techniques in judicial writing,155 judges
also have more long-range persuasive goals when drafting an opinion. As
one scholar notes, “[j]udges have employed storytelling in their
opinions,”156 not only to persuade litigants and other judges, but also to
prove to “the unforgiving critique of history that their decisions were
correct.”157 Indeed, posterity can provide quite an incentive given that
“[m]uch like useful craft objects that withstand the test of time, well-crafted
judicial opinions can take the status of art.”158
149

J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion,
14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 58 (2008) (noting that “[l]ittle
disagreement exists about the fact that narratives are fundamental to our understanding of
human experience.”).
150
Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter,
5 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 32, 46 (2008).
151
Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How
to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J.
459, 465 (2001) (quoting DAVID BALL, THEATER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR JURY TRIALS
66 (1994)).
152
Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins of Storytelling, 25 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 267, 293 (2008).
153
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 40.
154
Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 NOV. N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 10 (1997).
155
Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 260 n. 104 (1990) (“With respect to the reviewing court . . . the trial
judge’s goal is, in almost all instances, quite clear and direct: to persuade the appellate
judges that her ruling should be left undisturbed.”)
156
Rappaport, supra note 152, at 292.
157
Id.
158
Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
733, 751 n. 53 (2004).
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Despite the fact that legal narrative, like more traditional literary
narrative, has a persuasive function, legal narrative is nonetheless unique in
at least one respect. Specifically, “literary fiction evokes familiar life with
the aim of disturbing our expectations about it,”159 while “[l]egal stories
strive to make the world seem self-evident, a ‘continued story’ that inherits
a legitimated past.”160 Thus, one of the most important parts of almost any
legal narrative is the story of the precedent that will guide resolution of a
client’s case.161 As Ronald Dworkin notes, “a line of precedent is like a
continuing story.”162 As such, without the inclusion of the necessary
precedent, the legal narrative would be incomplete: “In offering an
interpretation, a legal storyteller appeals principally to the likeness between
her interpretation of the relevant facts in the present case and interpretation
of what she claims are similar cases in the past.”163 Given then a judge’s
interest in convincing a vast number of diverse readers that his opinion is
legitimate, it comes as little surprise that most judicial opinions first lay out
a detailed discussion of the guiding precedent before detailing how those
precedents helped determine the outcome.
Although the desire to persuade and justify may explain the reasons
behind including the “precedential story” within a legal narrative, the
question still remains as to how judges can draft this discussion so as to
make it fit seamlessly into the legal narrative, thus taking advantage of all
the potential for persuasion that narrative has to offer. For one thing, if
familiarity is what makes narrative such a persuasive communication
technique, it follows then that successful legal narrative will incorporate the
attributes of more traditional narrative. As Jerome Bruner points out, “So if
literary fiction treats the familiar with reverence in order to achieve
verisimilitude, law stories need to honor the devices of great fiction if they
are to get their full measure from judge and jury.”164
159

BRUNER, supra note 3, at 49.
Id.
161
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text; see also Bruner, supra note 3, at 116
(“Under the circumstances, history as well as precedent becomes relevant to the stories
offered by opposing attorneys.”). Thus, legal narrative involves much more than the facts
of the client’s case. In fact, narrative pervades legal documents, even operating to “shape
the choice of issues and the internal organizational structure of effective arguments.”
Meyer 12 Leg. Writing 229.
162
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 145, at 141 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE (1986)).
163
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 39.
164
Id. at 13; see also Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as
Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEAL WRITING INST. 127, 137 (2008) (“Fiction writers use a
literary tool kit to construct stories that are plausible, readable, and emotionally satisfying.
The kit contains at least the following elements: setting, conflict, character, point of view,
theme, and plot. Appellate brief writers . . . can use these tools too.”).
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In so doing, one such device that courts have used is foreshadowing.165
For example, in the 1989 case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of
Social Services,166 a majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court
held that a mother could not pursue a Section 1983 claim against a social
service agency for failing to remove her child from the home of the child’s
abusive father. As the dissent points out, however, one need not have read
the entire opinion to have a pretty good idea of the outcome: “by leading
off with a discussion (and rejection) of the idea that the Constitution
imposes on the States an affirmative duty to take basic care of their citizens,
the Court foreshadows—perhaps even preordains—its conclusion that no
duty existed even on the facts before us.”167
This use of foreshadowing in judicial narrative is not surprising given
the persuasive value of employing familiar literary devices in legal
narrative. Indeed, as noted earlier, foreshadowing is a conventional literary
device that has wide application and, thus, is one that audience members
would have routinely encountered.168
More importantly, however,
foreshadowing can be extremely persuasive given the impact it has on
human cognition. First off, foreshadowing, properly exercised, is subtle,
calling for implicit conclusions.169 As discussed supra, this subtlety can
greatly enhance persuasion, especially to the critical legal mind.170
Furthermore, foreshadowing recognizes that human perception is based, not
so much on external stimuli, but the hypotheses the brain makes on the
basis of that stimuli.171 Foreshadowing then, by unobtrusively planting
clues early on, can help control the creation of these hypotheses, leading the
viewer (seemingly on her own) to the conclusion the writer will ultimately
be advocating. On a more practical level, foreshadowing is a particularly
apt device to use while providing legal exposition given the fact that the
whole point of a legal precedence section is to explain to the legal audience
the law that the judge will ultimate apply in reaching her decision. Thus,
foreshadowing allows the judge to bridge the discussion of the law with the
ultimate legal analysis in such a way that the document is not only more
cohesive but more persuasive as well.

165

See Rappaport, supra note 152, at 293 (noting how some judges foreshadow their
result by the way in which they lay out the description of the client’s facts).
166
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
167
Id. at 204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168
See supra notes 8-9, 59 and accompanying text.
169
See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
170
See supra Part II.B.
171
See supra Part II.A.
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V. EXAMPLES OF FORESHADOWING IN JUDICIAL NARRATIVE
With this understanding of cognition, the importance of precedent
within judicial narrative and, more specifically, the power of
foreshadowing, the only question remaining is how exactly do judges
incorporate and combine these principles to make their written opinions
more persuasive. After all, the “characteristics of judicial opinions are not
happenstance,”172 so what conscious choices do judges make to take
advantage of the power of foreshadowing? To help answer that question,
this section will detail five principles relating to foreshadowing, looking at
specific examples of each and analyzing them in light of the psychological
theories discussed supra.173 These principles and their corresponding
examples are instructive in that they help 1) broaden our view of how
judicial opinions operate on a cognitive level and 2) advance our general
understanding of legal narrative and the role this narrative plays in legal
advocacy.
A. Phrasing Rules
When drafting the legal background section of a judicial opinion, judges
will typically begin with at least a recitation of the overarching rule of law.
Thus, in an opinion dealing with a substantive due process claim, the judge
would likely begin the legal background section with some reference to the
Fourteenth Amendment before then moving on to substantive due process
in general, followed by a discussion of analogous case law. Given that
these rules, in essence, form a large part of the schema that will guide legal
readers as they digest the opinion, rule statements present prime
opportunities for using foreshadowing. Indeed, much of the foreshadowing
that is found in judicial opinions can be found simply in how the judge lays
out the governing rules.
In many instances, this foreshadowing can be found in the subtle word
choices that the judge makes. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc.,174 the Court offered the following description of
rational basis scrutiny: “To withstand equal protection review, legislation
that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”175 Following that
description, the Court ultimately ruled that the legislation in that case,
which required special permits of homes for the mentally retarded, violated
172

Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 447.
See supra Part III.
174
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
175
Id. at 446.
173
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the Equal Protection clause given its lack of a rational basis.176 Now,
compare that statement of the rule with one a dissenting opinion, citing to
Cleburne, gave in Nguyen v. I.N.S.:177 “Under rational basis scrutiny, the
means need only be ‘rationally related’ to a conceivable and legitimate state
end.”178 In Nguyen, the dissent was describing the rational basis test to
illustrate how the challenged legislation in that case, which dealt with
gender discrimination, would likely satisfy rational basis but not the
heightened scrutiny standard.179 So, both refer to the exact same standard
but use different words—subtle word choices that prime the reader such that
rational basis scrutiny sounds somewhat easier to survive in Nguyen than in
Cleburne. Thus, minimal word changes can make a rule sound more or less
inclusive, thereby foreshadowing the ultimate application of that rule.
Of course, the use of foreshadowing in a governing rule statement need
not be so simple. Take, for example, Justice Scalia’s decision in Michael H.
v. Gerald D.,180 a case that concerned the due process rights of a nonmarital
father vis a vis the child he fathered with a married woman. Earlier on in
the opinion, Justice Scalia describes the challenged California law as
follows: “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.”181 At first blush, the reference to nature seems gratuitous—
why would Scalia use such wording? We, of course, do not know for sure
why he made this choice, but looking at the law as it stood prior to the
Court’s decision in Michael H. provides some possible rationales.
In a series of prior cases,182 the Court had established that biological ties
alone are insufficient to afford a nonmarital father with a due process
interest in his relationship with a child. Instead, only “[w]hen an unwed
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, [will] his
interest in personal contact with his child acquire[] substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause.”183 Based solely on this line of cases, then,
Michael H. seemingly would prevail on his claim given that he had spent
176

Id. at 448.
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
178
Id. at 78.
179
Id. at 83 (“If rational basis scrutiny were appropriate in this case, then the claim . . .
would have much greater force.”).
180
491 U.S. 110 (1989)
181
Id. at 118.
182
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983). For an excellent analysis and synthesis of these cases (including Michael H.) see
Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV.
637 (1993).
183
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
177
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significant time and resources developing a relationship with his daughter.
Ruling against Michael H. meant that Justice Scalia must distinguish this
long line of precedent.
Scalia thus began this challenge with the “nature itself” line. With that
as his opening, a bit later in the opinion, Justice Scalia phrased the
governing rule as follows:
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the
[Due Process] Clause, we have insisted not merely that the
interest denominated as a “liberty” be “fundamental” . . .
but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our
society. As we have put it, the Due Process Clause affords
only those protections “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Our cases reflect “continual insistence upon respect for the
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society.184
Scalia then quickly dismantles Michael H.’s argument that the Court’s
previous decisions on nonmarital fathers supports his argument: “As we
view them, they rest not upon such isolated factors but upon the historic
respect—indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term—traditionally
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family.”185
Still Scalia is not done stressing the role of tradition and history. Indeed,
throughout his opinion he repeats the point many times:


“Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and [his
daughter] has been treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society.”186



“Since it is Michael’s burden to establish that such power [of the
biological father to assert parental rights over a child born into a
woman’s existing marriage to another man] (at least where the
natural father has established a relationship with the child) is so
deeply embedded within our traditions as to be a fundamental right,
the lack of evidence alone might defeat his case.”187

184

491 U.S. at 122.
Id. at 123.
186
Id. at 124.
187
Id. at 125.
185
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“What we must establish, therefore, is not that our society has
traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to
establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father
parental rights, or at least has not traditionally denied them.”188

Regardless of whether Scalia did so intentionally, his repeated
references to history and tradition as being the central inquiry in this
determination helps undermine what was previously considered to be the
standard by which such claims were adjudicated. Indeed, prior to Michael
H., the schema under which most legal readers would operate was simply
that a nonmarital father acquires a liberty interest whenever he has formed a
biological and social connection with his child. Scalia’s opinion, however,
effectively alters that schema (or at least muddies it) by repeatedly recasting
the claimed liberty interest as instead residing only in those relationships
that history and tradition has embraced (which Scalia argues excludes
adulterous relationships).189 This repetition is likely no accident. As one
scholar notes: “Repetition reaffirms the data on which hypotheses should
be ground.” 190
Of course it was not through repetition alone that Scalia cast the law in
this light—instead, he set up the entire characterization down this path with
his initial phrase “like nature itself.” If the reader accepts Scalia’s narrative
as to the appropriate legal standard, then Michael H.’s seemingly surprising
loss under the Court’s previous holdings is perhaps a bit less surprising.
B. Framing Case Law
Just as judges can manipulate the way in which they describe governing
rules so too can judges manipulate the way in which they describe
analogous case law to foreshadow the court’s ultimate ruling. Given the
role that precedence plays in legal narrative, this is a particularly apt place
for judges to consider the persuasive benefits of foreshadowing. After all,
stare decisis itself forms part of the overarching schema that guides legal
readers when reading a judicial opinion. For this reason, Bruner notes that
“[t]o prevail, legal stories must be devised with a sharp eye to discerning
which cases in the past were similar to the present one and judged in a
188

Id. at 126.
As noted earlier, an author can make it less likely that a reader will conjure up a
certain “unfavorable” schema to analyze the document if the author includes sufficient
details that are seemingly incompatible with that schema. See supra notes 119-120 and
accompanying text.
190
BORDWELL, supra note 17, at 164; see also id. at 80 (Noting that repetition can
“direct the viewer toward the most probable hypothesis”).
189
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manner favoring one’s side.”191
To illustrate how the principle of foreshadowing operates in case
description, consider the following examples taken from the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc.192 In that case, a male
employee, who was gay, sued his employer under Title VII after enduring
numerous taunts and physical assaults at the hands of his male
coworkers.193 Both the district court and the initial Ninth Circuit panel
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, reasoning that, in
essence, Rene’s claim was essentially based on a claim of harassment due to
sexual orientation and not “sex” as required for a Title VII action.194
However, in the eventual en banc decision, discussed below, the majority
finds that Rene has indeed set out a cognizable claim and thus reverses the
grant of summary judgment.195
Turning to that en banc opinion, the majority states early on its
description of the governing rule that “[p]hysical sexual assault has
routinely been prohibited as sexual harassment under Title VII.”196 What
follows is then a string cite (with parenthetical) of twelve cases, each of
which involved a physical sexual assault.197 Shortly thereafter, the majority
moves on to its description of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.198:
As recounted by the Court, the Title VII plaintiff in Oncale
had been “forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating
actions” and had been “physically assaulted . . . in a sexual
manner” by other males at his place of employment. We
know from the circuit court’s opinion that this physical
assault included, among other things, “the use of force [by
one co-worker] to push a bar of soap into Oncale’s anus
while[another co-worker] restrained Oncale as he was
showering[.]” . . . Based on these facts, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which had affirmed a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant-employer.199
Following this description of Oncale, the majority tells us, several
191

BRUNER, supra note 3, at 43.
305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
193
Id. at 1064.
194
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001).
195
Id. at 1068.
196
Id. at 1065.
197
Id. at 1065-66.
198
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
199
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1066.
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paragraphs later when it moves to the facts of Rene’s case, that: “[W]e are
presented with the tale of a man who was repeatedly grabbed in the crotch
and poked in the anus, and who was singled out from his other male coworkers for this treatment.”200 In light of how the majority described
Oncale, coupled with its explicit mention of these specific facts from
Rene’s case, most readers would immediately be able to predict where the
majority is heading. Indeed, by casting Oncale as being almost completely
about physical sexual assault, the fact that Rene also encountered such
assaults, leads to the immediate prediction that Oncale controls and, thus,
Rene’s “defendant-employer” should lose. In other words, the Ninth
Circuit’s description of Oncale effectively creates an association between
physical sexual assault and victory for the plaintiff. As a result, learning
that Rene suffered such conduct makes it more likely that a reader will
immediately associate (seemingly on his own) that fact with victory given
that the reader has been primed to associate those facts with a specific
result.201
Compare, however, the majority’s description with that of the dissent.
The dissent does concede that Oncale “did involve harassment of the male
plaintiff by his male co-workers, some of which was similar to the
harassment in this case.”202 Nonetheless, the dissent then tells us a bit more
about the procedural posture of Oncale:
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the employer on the ground that “Mr.
Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for
harassment by male co-workers.” The sole issue before the
Supreme Court on certiorari was whether same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Court held
that is was. However, the Supreme Court explained, “Title
VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in
the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . .
because of . . . sex.’” . . . Thus the Supreme Court in
Oncale did not hold that the harassment alleged by the
plaintiff in that case was actionable under Title VII. The
Court, rather, simply rejected the Fifth Circuit’s holding
that same-sex harassment could never be actionable under
200
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Title VII. . . . After clarifying that same-sex sexual
harassment could be actionable under Title VII, the Court
remanded to the Fifth Circuit to address the question of
whether the harassment was “because of sex.”203
The dissent then, when moving to its analysis, focused exclusively on why
Rene had not proven that the alleged discrimination was “because of sex.”
Note that the majority opinion never tells the reader that the case was
ultimately remanded for a subsequent determination. Instead, it merely
related that the Supreme Court “reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which had affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant-employer.”204 Additionally, it focused almost
exclusively on the offensive sexual conduct that was present in Oncale,
ignoring the Supreme Court’s statement that “Title VII does not prohibit all
verbal or physical assault in the workplace.”205 The majority’s reason for
omitting these items, most likely, was that the majority was tailoring the
discussion of Oncale to foreshadow the ultimate holding and rationale in
Rene. If the test is merely “offensive sexual conduct” equals “reversal of
summary judgment for the employer,” then there can be but one result for
Rene given that the lower court granted summary judgment for the
employer, and Rene suffered offensive sexual conduct.
Thus, foreshadowing is extremely useful in judicial opinions when the
court is describing a precedent case. First, describing that case broadly can
allow the judge to focus on facts in the precedent case that are likewise
present in the case under consideration so as to foreshadow the court’s
ultimate holding, which of course becomes more persuasive to the reader if
the judge’s characterization of the precedent case is to be believed. In
essence, the court is essentially reducing the description of that precedent
case to the following formula:
In [favorable precedent case], the court ruled that
[whatever ruling the author judge is ultimately heading
toward] because of [fact or circumstance that exists in
both the precedent case and the current case].
Second, when it comes to unfavorable precedent, a judge can describe the
case very specifically, focusing on the facts in the precedent that are
missing from the case under consideration. In so doing, the fact that the
judge ultimately distinguishes that case is more palatable to the reader given
203
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the way in which the case was initially described. Thus, the formula for
describing an unfavorable precedent case becomes:
In [unfavorable precedent case], the court ruled that [the
opposite ruling the author judge is ultimately heading
toward] because of [fact or circumstance that exists in
the precedent case but not the current case].
This is not to suggest, of course, that judges engage in formulaic
opinion writing. Instead, it is merely to illustrate the essential method by
which a court can easily craft a description of a precedent case so as to
shape the schema by which the reader will be inclined to hypothesize an
outcome that not only “feels” correct to the reader, but that also matches the
court’s outcome. The pliable nature of cases makes this a fairly convenient
formula. Indeed, as most advocates are well aware, any case can be
distinguished or likened to any other case, the trick is merely how broadly
or narrowly one reads the precedent case. For instance, the Rene majority
read Oncale quite broadly, focusing generally on offensive sexual conduct.
This broad reading, of course, makes it easier for Rene’s case to fit under
Oncale’s ambit. The dissent, in contrast, focused very specifically on
Oncale, essentially limiting it to one very specific proposition: same-sex
harassment will not, per se, defeat a claim under Title VII, but the plaintiff
still must prove that the harassment was sex-based. This specific
formulation of Oncale thus makes it harder for Rene to avail himself to the
Oncale holding.
Finally, it is not the intent of this Article to imply that judge’s actively
manipulate the holdings of precedential cases to justify a decision the judge
has already reached. Instead, this Article assumes that most judges exercise
good-faith in interpreting and applying precedential cases. After all, “[n]o
judge or group of judges can state unequivocally and without distortion the
holding of a prior case or the precise rule to be applied in the case at
hand.”206 This is so because “[t]o find and apply a rule of law requires
interpretation of past precedent, and the act of interpretation necessarily
involves some degree of misreading.”207 The point here is merely that how
judges describe and phrase their interpretation of precedent can foreshadow
the judges’ ultimate disposition, making it likely that a reader will accept
that disposition as just.
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C. Side-Stepping Cases and Rules of Law
Beyond rules and precedent cases, judges are sometimes swayed instead
by other considerations, most notably public policy. However, when a
judge rules on the basis of the latter, seemingly in contravention of clear
precedent, two concerns may arise. The first, if the judge sits on a lower
court, is the fear of being overturned.208 The second, concerns public
relations. Indeed, it is unlikely that many judges would welcome the label
“activist judge,” but this is precisely the term that might arise should the
judge’s opinion fail to convince readers that this departure from the “law” is
justified. Again, foreshadowing is an extremely helpful tool in this
situation.
For example, in a 1993 case, the Supreme Court of Vermont was faced
with whether a same-sex partner should be allowed to adopt her partner’s
biological child without severing the parental rights of the natural parent.209
The statute in Vermont provided that:
The natural parents of a minor shall be deprived, by the
adoption, of all legal right to control of such minor, and
such minor shall be freed from all obligations of obedience
and maintenance to them . . . . Notwithstanding the
foregoing provisions of this section, when the adoption is
made by a spouse of a natural parent, obligations of
obedience to, and rights of inheritance by and through the
natural parent who has intermarried with the adopting
parent shall not be affected.210
This statute was designed to give step-parents the ability to adopt their
spouse’s child without interfering with the parental rights of the natural
parent. However, in this 1993 case, the court was faced with a lesbian
couple who, at that time at least, could not legally marry.211 It would seem
then that the plain language of the statute would preclude the requested
adoption.
Before ruling, however, the court described the governing rule as
follows:
In interpreting Vermont’s adoption statutes, we are
mindful that the state’s primary concern is to promote the
208
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welfare of children, and that application of the statutes
should implement that purpose. In doing so, we must avoid
results that are irrational, unreasonable or absurd. We must
look “not only at the letter of the statute but also its reason
and spirit.”212
Assuming the reader accepts this description of the rule, it then comes as
less objectionable and likely even less surprising when the court ultimately
rejects the plain language of the statute and permits “same-sex adoptions to
come within the step-parent exception.”213
A similar use of foreshadowing can be found in court decisions where
the court ultimately decides to depart from stare decisis and overturn what
would have otherwise been binding precedent. For example, in Lawrence v.
Texas,214 the Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick.215 Before
doing so, however, it made the following ominous statement: “The doctrine
of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the
Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable
command.”216 With that statement, the Court’s eventual pronouncement
that “Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled”217 is much less
surprising as the reader has been primed for that possibility. In fact, many
readers would have anticipated just such a result based on the way the Court
had structured the opinion, foreshadowing the impending demise of Bowers.

D. Inoculating
Judges are no doubt well-aware that their opinions can and (likely) will
be used against them either by the parties on appeal, by dissenting judges,
by future litigants in future cases, and perhaps even by the public at large.
As a result, the use of foreshadowing in an opinion may go well beyond
simply helping the judge announce and justify a discrete result. Instead, it
is entirely conceivable that judges, when crafting a judicial opinion, will
frequently take a more long-term view of the impact of their words. It is
212
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this context that inoculation theory comes heavily into play. Indeed, it is
not uncommon to see portions of a judicial opinion that could only have
been prompted by how the opinion might be subsequently used by a third
party.
Once again, Lawrence v. Texas218 provides an illustrative example. In a
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor agreed that the Texas law, which
banned same-sex sodomy, was unconstitutional.219 However, in contrast to
the majority, which relied on substantive due process, O’Connor instead
relied on Equal Protection given that the Texas law at issue did not prohibit
sodomy by opposite-sex couples. Regardless, Justice O’Connor devoted the
entire next-to-last paragraph of her concurrence to make the following
statement:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct
is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does
not mean that other laws distinguishing between
heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fall under
rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate
state interest here, such as national security or preserving
the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral
disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state
interest in this case—other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond mere disapproval of an
excluded group.220
From this paragraph, it would appear that Justice O’Connor is somewhat
concerned that third-parties may attempt to use her decision as support in
subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell
and prohibitions on gay marriage. O’Connor thus tries to inoculate legal
audiences against such an argument by 1) identifying the threat (i.e., the use
of her concurrence to support such claims) and 2) providing refutational
preemptions to combat such threats (i.e., in those cases, there is a legitimate
state interest).221
Another circumstance that can precipitate inoculation is when a court
issues what it knows will be a very controversial opinion, one that is likely
to prompt strong public disagreement. For example, in an opinion222
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denying a motion for a rehearing en banc of Newdow v. U.S. Congress,223
where the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Pledge of Allegiance was
unconstitutional given that it contained the words “under God,” Judge
Reinhardt made the following lengthy statement:
The Bill of Rights is, of course, intended to protect the
rights of those in the minority against the temporary
passions of a majority, which might wish to limit their
freedoms or liberties . . . . It is the highest calling of federal
judges to invoke the Constitution to repudiate unlawful
majoritarian actions and, when necessary to strike down
statutes that would infringe on fundamental rights, whether
those statutes are adopted by legislatures or by popular
vote. . . . Moreover, Article III judges are by constitutional
design insulated from the political pressures governing
members of the other two branches of government. . . . This
is not to say that federal judges should be completely
sequestered from the attitudes of the nation we serve, even
though our service is accomplished not through channeling
popular sentiment but through strict adherence to
established constitutional principles. . . . We may not—we
must not—allow public sentiment or outcry to guide our
decisions.224
In making this statement, Judge Reinhardt, like O’Connor in Lawrence,
identified a threat (i.e., people are going to be angry) and then provided
refutation preemptions (i.e., it is our job to make such difficult
constitutional decisions without reference to public opinion). These are but
two examples of judges using inoculation techniques in anticipation of
negative consequences that may otherwise flow from their opinion.
E. Minding “Chekhov’s Gun”
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that for judges, “as for any
successful storyteller, it is crucial that his ending seem inevitable.”225 As
explained throughout this Article, foreshadowing can help provide that
sense that the judge’s ultimate disposition was inevitable under the
governing law. However, for foreshadowing to work properly, the
storyteller has to make sure that all the parts of his story “are coherent in
223

292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
See supra note 222, at 470-71.
225
AMSTERDAM AND BRUNER, supra note 145, at 95.
224

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1454887

42

Something Judicious This Way Comes . . .

8/14/2009

relation to the main event.”226
This principle is known as “Chekhov’s Gun.” As the name implies, this
writing maxim comes from famous playwright Anton Chekhov and “says
that if you have a gun going off in the third act of a play, it had better sit on
the mantelpiece during the first two acts. Conversely, if a gun is clearly
visible on the mantelpiece for two acts, it had better go off during the
third.”227 Instead, if the gun has no purpose, then it should not be there in
the first place.228 The reason behind this maxim is that “critical plot
developments and critical characters must be clearly foreshadowed, not
dragged in from left field at the end of your novel.”229 Or, as one author
puts it, “any thing that enters the text must be integrally related to the fate of
the hero. There is no room for just anything that happens to fly by.”230
Failure to adhere to this principle violates the reader’s expectations in that if
a writer makes the conscious choice to “spend time and verbiage on
something early on, [readers] reasonably expect that thing to figure in the
climax or denouement.”231
In other words, foreshadowing within a judicial opinion requires both an
initial exposure to the relevant law followed later on by the application of
that law. Failure to provide both can result in an incoherent and perhaps
even confusing opinion. For instance, without some early mention of the
applicable law, the reader may feel as though the judge’s last-minute
invocation of law is a bit too convenient to be credible. Conversely, a
judicial opinion that discusses a rule of law yet reaches a decision without
ever applying that law could frustrate the reader’s predictive hypotheses,
which was likely formed on the basis of the seemingly relevant law that the
judge included. Given that humans “treasure predictability,”232 such a
result is to be avoided.
With this basic maxim in mind, take notice of the faithful allegiance to
“Chekhov’s Gun” in the remaining principles and examples in this
section.233 Indeed, you will see examples of statements that judges make
concerning the “objective” law and the way in which the phrasing of those
statements ultimately is relevant to the final disposition.
Additionally, however, there is another point related to “Chekhov’s
226
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Gun” that bears discussion here. When confronted with law that might
suggest a ruling contrary to the judge’s final determination, the temptation
could arise to omit said law so as not to violate the principle of “Chekhov’s
Gun.” After all, if the judge were to raise this law in the legal background
section, the reader would likely develop a strong expectation that the judge
will subsequently say how the law does or does not apply. On the other
hand, merely stating that the law does not apply in the legal analysis,
without some explanation as why not could appear a bit dodgy. It is not
inconceivable then to imagine a scenario in which a judge would simply
resolve this dilemma by wholesale omission of the troubling law.
Consider for example, the case of Romer v. Evans234 in which the
Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
that prevented any state anti-discrimination laws from protecting
homosexuals. At the time the case was heard, however, Bowers v.
Hardwick,235 a U.S. Supreme Court case which upheld the constitutionality
of state sodomy laws, was still good law. It would seem then that the
existence of Bowers would have presented somewhat of an obstacle for the
Court in Romer. As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Romer, “If it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other
laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.”236 How then did the
majority get around this argument that perhaps, under Bowers, the Colorado
amendment in Romer was constitutional?
Unfortunately, we can only guess because, in fact, the majority opinion
never even mentions its earlier decision in Bowers.237 This omission is
somewhat surprising to be sure (especially given that the majority would
surely have read Scalia’s dissent prior to publication). Obviously, there can
be a variety of reasons why the majority would have not addressed
Bowers,238 and it is not the intent of this Article to ascribe any dishonest
motives to the Court’s failure to do so. Nonetheless, it is at least worth
asking whether the omission (as well as similar omissions of seemingly
relevant law in other judicial opinions) was intentional so as not to violate
the “Chekhov’s Gun” principle. As Professor Cass Sunstein points out, “the
Court's silence about Hardwick stemmed from the fact that a majority could
234
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not be gotten to (a) distinguish Hardwick, (b) approve Hardwick, or (c)
overrule Hardwick. If each of these options was unavailable, silence was the
only alternative.” 239 Of course, this silence comes at a heavy price. As
Professor Nan Hunter points out, the failure of the majority opinion in
Romer to even mention Bowers “does weaken the persuasive power of the
decision.”240
CONCLUSION
Despite the common understanding of the word, “foreshadowing” is not
merely a literary device used by clever authors. Instead, foreshadowing
plays an integral part in both narrative and, more generally, human
cognition. As Professor Angel Medina aptly describes, “[h]uman reason is
narrative because it extends from its inception and in every one of its acts
toward the foreshadowing of its total course.”241 In other words, this
“device” resonates with how the human mind naturally works, thus making
foreshadowing an extremely persuasive technique. To see the power of
foreshadowing, one need only examine the narrative found within judicial
opinions. Indeed, as discussed and illustrated supra,242 judges attempt to
make their opinions more persuasive by consciously tailoring the way in
which they introduce and discuss legal precedent—the goal being to
foreshadow the court’s ultimate holding. Given the psychology behind
foreshadowing, the subtlety with which it operates and also the manner in
which legal audiences (like all humans) will read and perceive a judicial
opinion, foreshadowing is an exceptionally powerful tool in any judge’s
arsenal. 243
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